Rivers State Political Crisis Post Emergency Rule: Illusion of Reconciliation – Resumption Of Hostilities – And How We Arrived At This Point— By Bishop C. Johnson

Emergency rule, by its very nature, is a coercive instrument of last resort. In Rivers State, it temporarily suppressed visible conflict but did not resolve the underlying struggle for political control. While governance appeared stabilized on the surface, the intervention merely froze hostilities rather than dismantling the rival power structures that had evolved during and after Wike’s tenure as governor. The deep personalization of power in Rivers politics, combined with entrenched patronage networks, meant that the emergency rule functioned as an administrative pause rather than a political solution. The absence of a comprehensive truth-and-reconciliation mechanism allowed grievances, suspicions, and strategic calculations to remain intact beneath the imposed calm.

Proclaimed under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) on March 18, 2025, following prolonged executive-legislative deadlock, pipeline vandalism threats, and reported paralysis in budget processes and salary payments, the six-month measure suspended Governor Siminalayi Fubara, Deputy Governor Prof. Ngozi Nma Odu, and the 32-member House of Assembly. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu justified the action by citing a “total paralysis of governance,” where the governor refused to present appropriation bills to a majority faction in the Assembly, leading to halted federal allocations and stalled public service operations. The President then appointed Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas (rtd.), a retired Chief of Naval Staff with a record of disciplined maritime leadership, as sole administrator aimed explicitly at restoring law and order, stabilizing the polity, preventing sabotage of critical oil infrastructure, and creating conditions for democratic resumption.

During the period from March 19, 2025, onward, the sole administrator executed targeted measures to achieve these ends: conducting security consultations with senior officials and federal delegations at Government House in Port Harcourt shortly after assumption; issuing a statewide broadcast warning against oil pipeline sabotage and violence while pledging neutrality and civil liberties protection; overseeing the peaceful conduct of local government elections on August 30, 2025, through the empowered Rivers State Independent Electoral Commission (RSIEC); and facilitating the swearing-in of elected chairmen and councillors across all 23 local government areas, which marked the fulfillment of grassroots democratic restoration. These steps enabled salary payments to resume via federal releases, maintained fiscal continuity through caretaker arrangements, and prevented escalation into broader insecurity in the Niger Delta’s key oil-producing hub.

Despite these operational achievements in halting immediate breakdowns—such as averting further disruptions to economic assets vital for national revenue— the emergency’s coercive framework exposed inherent limitations. It addressed symptoms of institutional gridlock without engaging root causes like competing claims over resource allocation authority, loyalty-based appointments in civil service commissions and local structures, and the persistence of informal influence networks that predated the crisis. No formal mechanisms were instituted for mediated dialogue on past grievances or for independent audits of financial management during the interregnum, leaving space for perceptions of uneven resource handling, halted project momentum (including major infrastructure like the ring road and civil servants’ quarters), and unresolved questions about continuity in developmental priorities.

Minister Nyesom Ezenwo Wike contributed positively during this phase by publicly affirming the emergency’s finite timeline and supporting its timely conclusion. In statements around August 2025, including during voter engagements on election day, he described the measure as having “saved the day” by restoring peace, praised grassroots turnout in the local polls, and advocated for strengthened local government development as the foundation for progress. His emphasis on constitutional adherence, reconciliation, and forward-looking stability reinforced a constructive role in aligning with the federal directive’s intent to enable a return to elected governance without prolonging external oversight.

Ultimately, the emergency rule illustrated both its logic as an extraordinary stabilizer in acute crises and its limits as a non-transformative tool in deeply personalized political environments, where power remains embedded in enduring networks rather than fully autonomous institutions.

The post-emergency period began with cautious optimism. Meetings facilitated by President Tinubu and involving Wike, Fubara, and Amaewhule appeared to yield agreements on governance and cooperation. The immediate aftermath of the emergency rule’s termination in mid-September 2025 ushered in a phase marked by guarded hopefulness among political observers and stakeholders in Rivers State. High-level discussions, personally overseen by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the Aso Rock Presidential Villa in Abuja, brought together Minister of the Federal Capital Territory Nyesom Ezenwo Wike, Governor Siminalayi Fubara, and Speaker Rt. Hon. Martins Chike Amaewhule to forge pacts on essential administrative matters. These sessions, held in late September 2025, resulted in outlined commitments to joint decision-making on executive appointments, legislative oversight of fiscal policies, and collaborative initiatives for infrastructure upkeep, signaling a collective intent to prioritize state progress over past disputes.

However, underlying tensions persisted. By late 2025, accusations surfaced regarding non-compliance with peace deal terms, including budget handling, appointments, and alleged neglect of public infrastructure like schools. Despite these foundational agreements, subtle undercurrents of discord began to emerge, challenging the durability of the brokered harmony. By November 2025, reports from within the Rivers State Government House in Port Harcourt highlighted discrepancies in adherence to the reconciliation framework, particularly in areas such as the allocation of funds for ongoing projects, the nomination of key officials to vacant positions in agencies like the Rivers State Independent Electoral Commission, and the maintenance of vital public assets including primary and secondary educational facilities across local government areas such as Obio/Akpor and Ikwerre.

A pivotal escalation occurred when Speaker Martins Chike Amaewhule, during a plenary session at the Rivers State House of Assembly complex in Port Harcourt on December 8, 2025, voiced concerns over Governor Fubara’s handling of state resources, citing instances of expenditures not vetted by the legislature and a perceived lag in executing decisions from the Abuja-mediated talks, such as the joint review of procurement processes for school renovations. Amaewhule, drawing from his role as the presiding officer with oversight responsibilities under Section 128 of the 1999 Constitution, emphasized the need for transparency to sustain the post-emergency stability, framing his remarks as a call for accountability rather than confrontation. Earlier criticisms from the Speaker on December 1, 2025, had highlighted severe decay in public schools, including vandals occupying premises, pupils learning without teachers, one teacher handling two classrooms simultaneously, absence of toilets and electricity in facilities near key sites like the PHED headquarters, and overall unacceptable conditions despite substantial state savings left by the sole administrator.

In response, Governor Fubara, addressing a gathering of traditional rulers and community leaders at the Banquet Hall in Government House on December 10, 2025, expressed disappointment over obstacles hindering the reconciliation process, specifically referencing protracted postponements in scheduling follow-up consultations that were intended to address implementation hurdles. Fubara highlighted his administration’s proactive steps, including the initiation of audits for educational infrastructure to identify repair needs in schools like the Model Primary School in Eleme and the Government Comprehensive Secondary School in Borikiri, as evidence of commitment to the agreements, while affirming education as a top priority with the largest allocation planned for the 2026 budget.

Throughout this period of mounting challenges, Minister Nyesom Ezenwo Wike played a constructive role as a bridge-builder, leveraging his extensive experience in state governance to advocate for continued dialogue. In a public address during a community engagement event in Obio/Akpor Local Government Area on November 15, 2025, Wike urged all parties to honor the spirit of the Abuja accords by focusing on developmental priorities, such as enhancing school facilities to improve literacy rates among Rivers youth. His interventions, including private communications with both Fubara and Amaewhule to facilitate additional meetings, exemplified a forward-thinking approach to resolving emerging issues, ensuring that the reconciliation efforts remained oriented toward long-term state unity and prosperity without tying outcomes to any fixed electoral timelines.

These early frictions, while testing the resilience of the post-emergency framework, underscored the complexities of transitioning from federal intervention back to autonomous state operations, with key figures like Amaewhule exercising legislative checks to safeguard fiscal integrity, Fubara advancing executive initiatives for public welfare, and Wike providing seasoned guidance to prevent escalation.

A major turning point came in December 2025, when Speaker Rt. Hon. Martins Chike Amaewhule and approximately 17 other members of the Rivers State House of Assembly defected from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to the All Progressives Congress (APC) on December 5, 2025. The announcement occurred during a plenary session at the Assembly complex in Port Harcourt, where Amaewhule, representing Obio/Akpor I constituency, formally declared his decision by notifying his ward chairman, Mr. Osondo Orlu, of his exit from the PDP. He cited the deepening internal divisions and factionalization within the PDP as the primary driver, describing the party’s national crisis as irreconcilable and hindering effective representation of constituents. The defecting lawmakers included key figures such as Deputy Speaker Dumle Maol (Gokana), Majority Leader Major Jack (Akuku-Toru I), Deputy Majority Leader Linda Somiari-Stewart (Okrika), Chief Whip Franklin Nwabuchi (Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni I), Deputy Whip Ofiks Kabang (Andoni), Solomon Wami (Port Harcourt I), Azeru Opara (Port Harcourt III), Smart Adoki (Port Harcourt II), Enemi George (Asari-Toru II), Igwe Aforji (Eleme), Tekena Wellington (Asari-Toru I), Looloo Opuende (Akuku-Toru II), Peter Abbey (Degema), Arnold Dennis (Ogu/Bolo), Chimezie Nwankwo (Etche), and Gerald Oforji (Oyigbo). This shift left the APC with a majority in the 32-member House, as the remaining 10 PDP members promptly elected Sylvanus Nwankwo (Omuma) as Minority Leader to reorganize their caucus.

This move was attributed to internal divisions within the PDP and strategic realignment toward the ruling party at the federal level, with Amaewhule praising President Bola Ahmed Tinubu as a compassionate leader whose policies had boosted state and local government funding for obligations like salary payments. The defections received confirmation from Rivers State APC Chairman Chief Tony Okocha, who witnessed the plenary and affirmed the lawmakers’ registration as new APC members.

Shortly after, on December 9, 2025, Governor Siminalayi Fubara and his deputy also defected to the APC. Fubara announced the decision during an emergency stakeholders’ meeting at Government House in Port Harcourt, framing it as gratitude to President Tinubu for his interventions, including the emergency rule resolution that preserved his administration. He positioned himself as a supporter of the president’s agenda, declaring that without Tinubu’s support there would be no “His Excellency Siminalayi Fubara” today, and emphasized returning the favor by ensuring smooth APC operations in the state. Fubara claimed leadership in the state’s APC structure (referencing “001” status), though Wike dismissed this, emphasizing that party leadership begins at ward levels and that late defections did not confer automatic control.

These defections, intended perhaps to consolidate power or neutralize rivalries, instead intensified divisions. Wike, remaining influential in APC circles at the federal level despite his PDP roots, viewed Fubara’s move as a betrayal, particularly amid disputes over control of political structures ahead of future elections. In responses during media engagements and community addresses in late December 2025, Wike clarified that Fubara required no personal clearance for the switch, describing it as a natural progression following the Assembly members’ earlier realignment. He underscored his enduring grassroots influence, noting that true party leadership derives from ward-level structures built over years, and affirmed that no candidate succeeds in Rivers without alignment to established networks. Wike’s measured stance highlighted his commitment to principled politics, focusing on long-term stability and effective governance rather than short-term shifts, while reinforcing his role as a key architect of political strategy who prioritizes constitutional adherence and developmental outcomes.

Hostilities fully resumed in early January 2026. On January 8–9, 2026, the APC-dominated Rivers State House of Assembly, led by Speaker Rt. Hon. Martins Chike Amaewhule, initiated fresh impeachment proceedings against Governor Siminalayi Fubara and Deputy Governor Prof. Ngozi Nma Odu. The process commenced during a plenary session at the Assembly complex in Port Harcourt on January 8, 2026, presided over by Speaker Amaewhule, where Majority Leader Major Jack (representing Akuku-Toru I constituency) formally read out the notice of allegations of gross misconduct. Signed by 26 lawmakers on January 5, 2026, the notice invoked Section 188 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and detailed seven specific charges against Fubara, including recalcitrant disobedience to constitutional provisions, failure to present an official statement of account since May 29, 2023, extra-budgetary expenditures without legislative approval, withholding of funds allocated to the Rivers State House of Assembly Service Commission, demolition actions affecting legislative facilities, non-compliance with Supreme Court rulings on legislative financial autonomy, and general financial impropriety alongside unauthorized spending. A separate notice was read by Deputy Majority Leader Linda Somiari-Stewart against Deputy Governor Prof. Ngozi Nma Odu, accusing her of similar gross misconduct. The Assembly halted Fubara’s presentation of the Mid-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the 2026 Appropriation Bill until a probe concluded, with Speaker Amaewhule gaveling the adjournment of proceedings to January 15, 2026, for further steps.

Amaewhule described Fubara as a “mistake” and insisted the crisis stemmed from constitutional violations, not personal rivalry with Wike, emphasizing during plenary that “this is not about personalities; the governor is not fighting any individual; he is fighting against the Constitution.” He vowed to pursue due process rigorously, stating the House would follow the law to its full course and that Rivers State had never experienced such governance challenges like under the current administration, particularly highlighting the unique delay in presenting a 2026 budget compared to other sub-national entities.

By January 16, 2026, following a one-week break, the House reconvened and voted unanimously to proceed with the investigations, despite an interim court injunction from the Rivers State High Court in Oyibo (sitting in Port Harcourt) issued that day, restraining Chief Judge Justice Simeon Chibuzor Amadi from constituting a seven-member probe panel. Four lawmakers who had initially distanced themselves—Minority Leader Sylvanus Nwankwo (Omuma), Peter Abbey (Degema), Barile Nwakoh (Khana I), and Emilia Amadi (Obio/Akpor II)—reversed their stance during a live broadcast outside the Assembly complex, endorsing the continuation and emphasizing the need to address governance lapses for the state’s benefit.

Wike’s public statements during “thank-you tours” across local governments hinted at viewing Fubara as ungrateful and unfit for a second term. In engagements starting January 3, 2026, in Okrika Local Government Area and continuing through Obio/Akpor and other areas, Wike, as FCT Minister, stressed the importance of gratitude and accountability in political relationships, underscoring that enduring alliances rest on honoring agreements reached post-emergency rule and reconciliation efforts. Drawing from his own tenure’s achievements in infrastructure and unity, his engagements with community leaders, party officials, and grassroots supporters reinforced a message of principled leadership, focusing on correcting past oversights to ensure stable, interest-driven governance without compromising democratic integrity.

The impeachment move by the State House of Assembly triggered widespread concern, with groups like the Ijaw National Congress (INC), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA), and others condemning it as reckless and destabilizing. The Eastern Zone of the INC, alongside the IYC Eastern Zone, held a joint press conference in Port Harcourt on January 8–9, 2026, describing the impeachment proceedings as an unfortunate escalation inconsistent with democratic norms and urging restraint to allow the peace accord brokered by President Tinubu to consolidate. The INC Eastern Zone also staged protests in Port Harcourt on January 19, 2026, declaring the impeachment plot unacceptable and warning of potential unrest, while asserting that Rivers people opposed destabilizing actions against Fubara. The IYC echoed calls for restraint, labeling the process a threat to Ijaw unity. HURIWA, through its National Coordinator Comrade Emmanuel Onwubiko, issued a statement on January 9 labeling the threat reckless, unconstitutional, and a grave danger to peace, calling for presidential intervention to prevent manufactured crises driven by factional interests. The Rivers Elders and Leadership Council, via Acting Chairman Dr. Gabriel Toby, condemned the Assembly for using impeachment as a vendetta tool, urging focus on stability post-emergency.

The Rivers State chapter of the All Progressives Congress (APC) publicly rejected the impeachment proceedings against Governor Siminalayi Fubara and his deputy, Prof. Ngozi Odu. The party described the move by the Rivers State House of Assembly as untenable and destabilising and urged lawmakers, especially APC members in the Assembly, to resist pressures to pursue the impeachment. It also said it would do everything possible to ensure the state government was not destabilised by the process. The party acknowledged the independence of the legislature but maintained it does not support resorting to impeachment against an APC-led government saying that the impeachment could worsen political tensions in the state. The State APC warned lawmakers, including its own members, not to give in to external pressures that could destabilise the government, tarnish the party’s image and stifle state progress, noting the existing emergency-era budget’s validity until August 2026 rendered the budget-related allegations moot.

With the collapse of the post-emergency consensus, Rivers State once again descended into institutional warfare. The House of Assembly, under Speaker Martin Chike Amaewhule on the one hand, and the executive arm, under Governor Siminalayi Fubara on the other, returned to open confrontation. As a result, Rivers State and its institutions of governance became both an arena and an instrument of political combat. In response, the executive sought alternative sources of legitimacy and protection outside the formal legislative framework. As the crisis deepens, governance suffered, as legislative-executive cooperation deteriorated, policy implementation stalled, and public administration became subordinate to factional calculations. The state’s democratic institutions, already weakened by past crisis and instability, proved incapable of independently mediating the conflict.

This breakdown followed a clearly traceable institutional sequence. The restoration of constitutional order after emergency rule returned all actors to their formal positions without recalibrating the operational boundaries between them. The Rivers State House of Assembly, led by Rt. Hon. Martin Chike Amaewhule, resumed its legislative authority with a renewed emphasis on procedural correctness, quorum discipline, and internal cohesion. Under Amaewhule’s leadership, the Assembly functioned with a high level of organizational clarity, reflecting a tradition of legislative assertiveness that had been cultivated during the tenure of Chief (Barr.) Nyesom Ezenwo Wike as governor. This tradition emphasized the autonomy of the legislature as a co-equal arm of government rather than a subordinate extension of the executive. For example, the House maintained strict adherence to standing orders in plenary sessions, required minimum quorum thresholds for major votes, and conducted committee sittings with documented minutes and public invitations to witnesses, practices that mirrored the structured legislative framework Wike had promoted through capacity-building workshops and constitutional training programs for lawmakers between 2015 and 2023.

The executive response to this assertive legislature took a different institutional path. Governor Sir Siminalayi Fubara, operating in an environment of contested authority, increasingly relied on executive instruments, administrative directives, and external validation to sustain governance. This divergence in institutional strategy transformed routine legislative procedures—such as budgetary reviews, confirmation of appointments, and oversight functions—into points of confrontation rather than cooperation. Each arm of government acted within its constitutional remit, yet the absence of mutual recognition converted legality into leverage. In late November 2025, for instance, the executive issued administrative circulars directing permanent secretaries to proceed with certain project disbursements based on emergency-era approvals, while the Assembly demanded fresh legislative ratification under Section 120 of the 1999 Constitution, leading to delays in payments for ongoing road rehabilitation contracts in Port Harcourt and Degema local government areas.

Public administration became an unintended casualty of this confrontation. Senior civil servants, permanent secretaries, and heads of agencies found themselves navigating competing signals from the legislature and the executive. Decision-making timelines lengthened, procurement processes slowed, and policy execution became reactive rather than programmatic. Ministries hesitated to act decisively where legislative approval appeared uncertain, while legislative committees intensified oversight as a means of asserting relevance. The Ministry of Works, for example, deferred the award of contracts for the rehabilitation of the Trans-Kalabari Road and the Port Harcourt Ring Road phase extensions pending Assembly confirmation of supplementary provisions, even though emergency caretaker budgets had allocated funds. Similarly, the Rivers State Civil Service Commission faced conflicting directives: executive memos instructed promotions and postings based on seniority lists approved pre-emergency, but the Assembly’s Public Service Committee summoned heads of service for questioning on alleged irregularities in those lists, resulting in paused implementation across multiple directorates. Governance did not collapse outright, but it functioned in a constrained and risk-averse mode, with monthly revenue releases from the federation account often routed through caretaker structures or federal oversight mechanisms to avoid direct confrontation at the state level.

Throughout this institutional divergence, Minister Nyesom Ezenwo Wike maintained a posture of constructive distance, offering public counsel on the value of inter-branch respect and constitutional harmony. During his thank-you tours in early January 2026, particularly in sessions with traditional rulers and civil service representatives in Obio/Akpor and Okrika, he highlighted the importance of disciplined administration and legislative-executive synergy, drawing from his own experience of fostering collaborative governance that delivered landmark projects such as the Dr. Peter Odili Cancer and Cardiovascular Disease Treatment Centre and the Trans-Kalabari Road. His interventions served as a reminder of the stabilizing role informal networks can play in reinforcing formal institutions, encouraging actors to prioritize service delivery and public welfare over prolonged standoffs.

This operational stalemate illustrates a deeper challenge in Nigeria’s sub-national politics: when formal restoration lacks accompanying mechanisms for boundary clarification—such as joint executive-legislative retreats, mandatory pre-budget consultation protocols, or independent mediation bodies—the return to constitutional offices can paradoxically entrench rather than resolve institutional friction. In Rivers State, the post-emergency period thus became a laboratory for observing how deeply embedded traditions of legislative independence (nurtured under Wike’s governorship) and executive prerogative interact in the absence of recalibrated trust, producing a governance environment that is legally compliant yet practically constrained.

Capt. Bishop C. Johnson, US Army (rtd), is a national defense and military strategist, and a political commentator.

Gatekeepers News is not liable for opinions expressed in this article; they’re strictly the writer’s